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Abram de Swaan, (2007) The language predicament of the EU since the enlargements. In Sociolinguistica (in press).

The language predicament of the EU since the enlargements.

In less than twenty months, the number of official languages in the European Union more than doubled. As of 2007, there are 27 member states with 23 languages, while until 2004 fifteen members used eleven. But even this spectacular expansion has not changed the basic dynamics of the language constellation in the EU. Since the accession of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark in 1973, it has been clear that the equality principle underlying the policy of multilingualism was in stark opposition to the efficiency principle of using only a few 'working' or 'relay' languages. [1]

The illusion of at least one member country, that French might (again) become the principal language of the Union had to be abandoned and the specter for many members that English would end up as the sole medium of the EU has loomed ever since. The insistence of a third country, Germany, that its language be used more intensely as an actual working language continues to be frustrated. The well-nigh unmanageable task of simultaneous interpretation between 23 languages now requires 506 (= 23*22) one-way interpreters, instead of the already quite unmanageable 110 under the regime of the E15.

Caught between the high principle of equality and the low principle of practicality, the European Parliament has sought relief by introducing some quite sensible stop gap measures without facing its dilemma head on. Instead, the EU continues its high-minded public discourse: 'It is this diversity that makes the European Union what it is: not a ‘melting pot’ in which differences are rendered down, but a common home in which diversity is celebrated, and where our many mother tongues are a source of wealth and a bridge to greater solidarity and mutual understanding. (A new framework…, 2005: I,1).[2] All the while, English continues to usurp ever more domains and functions as the lingua franca of Europe. [3] In brief: 'The more languages, the more English'. (De Swaan, 2001a: p. 144).

1. The impact of the recent enlargements on the European language constellation

On May, 1, 2004, ten new states joined the Union: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. By January 1, 2007, Bulgaria and Romania also joined, increasing the number of EU citizens from 390 million (E15) to 486 million (E27). A large majority of these newcomers speak Slavic languages, a group within the Indo-European language family that also encompasses the Germanic, Romance and Gaelic groups of languages which accounted for the vast majority of speakers in the EU 15 (Basque and Finnish being the major exceptions). Latvian and Lithuanian belong to the Baltic language group, also a branch of the Indo-European family.

Estonian is related to Finnish in the Finnish-Ugrian group, which belongs with Hungarian (Ugric group) in the Uralian family of languages. The Greek Cypriots speak Greek, and therefore did not add an official language to the Union's repertoire. Turkish is the official language in the Turkish part of Cyprus, which so far has remained outside the Union (although its citizens count as citizens of the EU in what is clearly a provisional arrangement). In Malta, Maltese (Malti) is the official language, a North African (Maghreb) version of Arabic with many Italian borrowing. Romanian is a Romance language with some similarity to Italian and many Slavic loanwords (Ethnologue).

Some of the Slavic languages are quite close: 'All Czech and Slovak dialects are inherently intelligible to each other's speakers.' (Cf. Ethnologue; Neustupný & Nekvapil, 2003: 256 ff.; Thomas, 2000). Both languages are quite similar to Polish, Russian, Ukranian and Belorussian. (A likeness that also applies to Serbian, written in Cyrillic alphabet, and Croatian, written in Roman characters; Garde, 2002). As the citizens of these Slavic countries number about 63 million, together they could probably exert considerable influence on the language policy of the EU, outnumbering as they do, the residents of the UK or France. Polish with 60% (38 million) of all Slavic speakers in the EU now ranks sixth in the EU.

Clearly, the recent additions have further inflated the language predicament of the EU, of the European Parliament especially, but they have not affected the overall pattern of competitive relations between the languages of the EU. All newly added languages, with the exception of Polish and Romanian (plm 22 milion), are quite small in terms of their users' numbers (less than 11 million), and none is supported by a sizeable contingent of speakers that learned any of them as a foreign language. The competition for privileged positions continues between the same frontrunners in decreasing order of importance: English, French, German, Spanish, and Italian (and maybe Polish). What matters is not only the number of native speakers of each language (German with 90 million comes first), but equally, if not more so, the number of non-native users, speakers who have acquired their skills later in life, overwhelmingly in language classes, and most of them in school. The dynamism of the language system clearly comes from the spread of languages through education.

1. The present language constellation of the EU

The European Union is a sub-system of the world language system (De Swaan, 2001a). Among the 6,000 or so languages spoken on earth, only one or two hundred are ‘central languages’, that serve to connect the speakers of various dialects, minority, regional and immigrant languages. They usually have an official status within the territory of a state, where they are the legal idiom of education, of the printed and electronic media, the courts, the bureaucracy and the government. They are codified in grammars, dictionaries and textbooks. In short, they are well protected and ‘robust’. All 23 official languages of the EU can qualify as such (except, maybe, Maltese). A few of these belong in a different league, they are among the dozen or so 'supercentral' languages in the world system, each serving to connect the speakers of a cluster of central languages. The supercentral languages that also function beyond the confines of Europe are French, Spanish, German, and, of course, English, the ‘hypercentral’ hub of the world system. Two other languages, without official status in the EU, nevertheless belong in this supercentral category: Russian and Turkish.

The ‘extramural’ functions of the supercentral languages are rarely taken into account in the discussion of the language constellation of the European Union, but for immigrants, tourists, business people and students they carry considerable weight in choosing which languages to learn. English spreads as fast in Asia and Africa as it does in Europe, and this once again adds to its attraction for prospective language students in Europe (it also goes far in explaining the options for French and Spanish).

In the contemporary world, languages still spread through conquest, conversion and commerce, as they always did, but another avenue has become much more important: formal education. As increasing numbers of children and adolescents go to school, even more so in Europe, formal instruction is now the paramount means of language acquisition. Parents and students are not entirely free to choose the languages to be learned, they depend on which ones are offered in the school curriculum. But school boards and education ministries anticipate the preferences of students and their parents, and take into account the expected trends in language spread in Europe and in the (Western) world. Thus, institutional and individual preferences for foreign languages are more or less adapted to one another and these preferences, in turn, are based on the perceived choices of language learners in other countries and other continents. If the expectation is that English will expand fastest, then that is sufficient reason to prefer English. This accounts for the ongoing stampede towards English in Europe and the rest of the world.

In the EU, this self-confirming, self-accelerating process of language acquisition has reached full force. The intrinsic linguistic characteristics of English have no part in this whatever. (If a commission were to pick a lingua franca regardless of its actual spread, the first to be discarded would be English by dint of its impossible orthography and pronunciation). The global presence of the other supercentral languages current in Europe apparently is not sufficient to affect the expectations and thus sway the preferences of prospective language learners in significant numbers.

Thus, in order to assess the present course of development of he European language constellation, the most important data are those concerning language learning. This is also a foremost concern of the European Commission which hopes to persuade all young Europeans to learn at least two foreign languages. Luckily, the EU commissioned an extensive survey of linguistic competences among 15,000 respondents in 27 member states and 2 prospective member countries in November/December, 2005 (Eurobarometer, 2006). The figures on foreign language skills in the new member states, providing a first view of recent changes in the European language constellation, are the most pertinent. The Tables of results (appendix, D48T) show that German is – slightly – ahead of English as a foreign language in the Czech republic (28 vs 24%), and Russian comes third place (20%). The same applies to Hungary: 25 % German vs 23% English and Russian (8%). The two leading languages tie for first place in Slowakia (32%), followed by Russian (29%) and Czech (25%). Czechs do not report skills in Slowakian) . Poles most frequently mention English as their foreign language (29%), closely followed by Russian (26%) and with German in third place (19%). In Slovenia, Croatian comes first (59%), followed by English and German (57 and 50%). The Baltic respondents frequently know Russian (66 to 80%); adding the minorities who speak Russian as their mother tongue would bring the prevalence of Russian there close to 100%. English comes second place in all three Baltic Republics, with 46% in Estonia, 39% in Latvia and 32% in Lithuania. German comes third place in Estonia (22%). Latvian (a 'foreign language' for the Russian minority) takes third position in Latvia with 23%. In Lithuania Polish comes third with 15%.

Of the two latest additions, Bulgaria fits the pattern with 35% of respondents mentioning Russian, 23% English and 12% German. Romanians, however, are somewhat of an exception: 29% are competent in English, but 24% report French as their foreign language, while German lags in third position with 6%.

In all these countries of the former Soviet bloc, English and German are on the rise, except in Romania. French is in decline or holds steady at a very low level (less than 10%) and Russian continues to lose ground rapidly (since students abandoned it after the Transition). Clearly, the accession of the former Communist countries has reinforced the pattern of English dominance, but also boosted the prevalence of German in the EU. In an enlarged Union French has not gained important reinforcements.

In Malta, 88% of those interviewed mention English as their foreign language and 66% Italian (like, belatedly, the Irish, the Maltese could well participate in the EU with English, but insisted on recognition of their indigenous language as an official language of the Union). Cyprus has 76% English speakers and small contingents of French (12%) and German (5%). Two pending candidates for membership, Croatia and Turkey, also have English as the first foreign language (49% and 17%), German is important in Croatia (34%) and, less so, Italian (14%). German plays a small role in Turkey (4%).

These potential members would not change much in the distribution of foreign language skills, but the accession of Turkey would in one stroke add 70 million Turkish speakers (some of whom speak it as an acquired language) to the one million or so members of Turkish speaking minorities throughout the Balkan and on Cyprus, and to the estimated 2,5 million Turkish immigrants, mostly in Germany and the Netherlands.

English and German have been strengthened as contenders for vehicular position, French has been relatively weakened. Spanish (i.e. Castillian) is visible as a foreign language only in Spain with 10% (among native speakers of the other 'official' languages of the land) and in the UK (8%). Italian plays a minor role, as mentioned, in Croatia and has a strong presence in tiny Malta.

In other words, Italian and Spanish hardly play a role in Europe outside their home countries. The game is still played in the major league of English, German and French, as it has been since 1973.

The relative positions of these major languages may be demonstrated by calculating their respective 'communication-value' or 'Q-value' (De Swaan, 2001a; (see also Appendix 3 below).

2. Changing power relations between the large language groups

From the perspective of language policy, the most important change that the recent enlargements have brought is the addition of more than 60 million speakers of Slavic languages. The enlargements have brought millions of Russian-speakers into the EU, native speakers in the Baltic states, and speakers of Russian as a foreign language in the Central and Eastern European states. However, although practically all high school students learned Russian while under Soviet hegemony, most of them apparently did so reluctantly. With the Transition, Russian rapidly declined as a foreign language. This downturn now seems to have touched bottom, as East-European students again become aware of the potential of Russian as a linking language with the nations of the former Soviet bloc.

With Maltese, an Arabic language has for the first time gained official status in the EU, where many millions of immigrants from North Africa, living mostly in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, already were brought up with Arabic (while another part has Berber, or Tamazight, as their native language). The other most important immigrant language, especially in the Netherlands and Germany, is Turkish. Immigrant languages are excluded from the protection which the EU and the Council of Europe grant to 'regional and minority languages.'

Finally, Ireland, 33 years after its accession, has claimed and obtained (by January 1, 2007) official status for Irish (Gaeilge), a language spoken on a daily basis at home by some 80,000 citizens, and, next to English, with varying degrees of competence and frequency (mostly by pupils in Irish lessons), by at most a million and a half out of the 4,5 million Irish citizens.

As matters stand, none of the new member states seems to muster sufficient political clout to have its language adopted as an actual working language in the deliberations of the European Council or the Commission's bureaucracy: a privilege which even German, the language with the most native speakers in the EU, has so far just barely been able to hold on to. Yet, Polish has been included as the sixth of the 'pivot' languages for translation of those documents of the European Parliament that must be published in all languages of the Union (European Community, Many tongues…; 2004: 18).

Of course, many of the new citizens of the EU speak Russian, even when they do not flaunt the fact. They are very unlikely to demand any kind of status for the former language of Soviet hegemony within the EU. They might of course capitalize on the fact that there is a high degree of similarity between Russian and Polish and that most other Slavic languages do not differ much more from Polish than, say, Spanish and French differ from each other. Such resemblances rarely inspired united action on language policy among the Romance speaking countries, and they are quite unlikely to do so among the speakers of the Slavic languages, where the 'narcissism of small differences' has driven apart rather intercomprehensible languages like Czech and moreover, the Baltic and Slavic countries lived under the hegemony of a single imperial language, Russian, much too long to turn now into champions of a single lingua franca for the Eastern part of the EU.

Thus, the new enlargements have introduced countries that will behave like most of the old members of the EU, they will pay pious lip service to full multilingualism in the best tradition of the Union, and they will tacitly support the ascendancy of one or two large languages as the actual communication media within the European institutions and across the lands of continental Europe.

Which of the major languages they will help to gain strength in the European arena can be inferred from the patterns of foreign language competence and especially foreign language learning in the new member states. But here, history plays its part.

Not even a century ago, German was the most important language of the Habsburg empire and the lingua franca of Central and most of Eastern Europe, with French as the second foreign language of choice. In Southeastern Europe, French was the second language of the educated bourgeoisie. Only after 1945, when the Soviet Union brought the Eastern part of the European subcontinent under its control, Russian was imposed as the lingua franca of the empire (Fodor & Peluau, 2003: 86). Initially, a lack of qualified teachers hampered its spread, in later years the students' aversion towards all things Russian or Soviet prevented them from learning the language, even more so when under Brezjnew language courses also included instruction in Russian culture: ‘Lack of motivation as well as antipathy toward the Soviet model led to a more or less conscious refusal to learn Russian in central Europe, on the contrary, after eight or ten years of learning the language, most students remained unable to express themselves in Russian.’ (Cf. Fodor and Peluau, 2003: 87).[4]

In fact, there was not much occasion to practice Russian outside the classroom, nor was there much opportunity to speak Western languages either, except German with the East Germans.

Interest in foreign languages grew slightly in the seventies, when the countries of the Soviet bloc opened up somewhat to the West. Only after the Transition, students massively dropped Russian and opted in vast numbers for English and German. French did not make much of a comeback (not even in Romania). There remains an urgent shortage of qualified teachers, even while instructors of Russian were quickly retrained to teach Western languages.

In the Central European countries both German and English now are the foreign languages of choice, but they spread along somewhat different trajectories. English is mostly taught in high schools that prepare for admission to the university, and predominantly in an urban setting, whereas German is taught more often in a rural setting and in vocational secondary education. Most likely, pupils at these schools consider the option of working in Germany and Austria at some point, whereas students anticipating an academic career prefer English as the global language of science and the humanities. (Cf. Medgyes & Miklósy, 2005: 35 ff., who also mention the accessibility of German tv; Neustupný & Nekvapil, 2003: 293ff.; Fodor & Peluau, 2003; Földes, 2001, point to similar trends in Central and Eastern Europe). But the scarcity of qualified teachers may also play a part in this respect.

German had been the major language of the Habsburg empire and the language of culture, science and of contact with the West. During the years of Nazi-occupation it was widely used in Central Europe and the Balkan, but also increasingly despised. For almost half a century after the Second World War, Russian met a similar reception. As a consequence, in the seventies and eighties many intellectuals turned to English as the language of liberty, untainted by the memories which still adhered to German or by the aversion that the imposition of Russian continued to provoke.

The Baltic states had a quite different history as they were formally annexed by the Soviet Union after World War II. As the Soviet regime encouraged immigration, Estonia and Latvia have considerable Russian speaking minorities (18 and 27%, in Lithuania only 7%; Eurobarometer, 2006: D48A) [5] Stalin imposed his language policies and his successors were as insistent on the predominance of Russia in the Baltic countries. Officially the ‘titular’ language of each Baltic Republic was an official language next to Russian. In fact, some kind of 'asymmetrical bilingualism' prevailed (Wright, 1999; 10): since the language of one Baltic Republic had no official status in another, bounder-crossing communication required the Balts to learn Russian, as the 'central language' connecting a cluster of 'peripheral' languages.(De Swaan, 2001a: p. 4). This once again accelerated the Russification of the Baltic language constellation. When Independence came, a backlash set in, the official position of Russian was downgraded or even abolished, sometimes against strong opposition from the Russian minorities. In preparation of the accession to the EU, the Baltic states adopted some guarantees for the language rights of their Russian speaking population. As a result, Russian now counts as a protected 'regional or minority language' in the EU. In fact, Russian is much more prevalent in the Baltic lands than in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, which remained nominally independent. In 2005, of all Balts who did not mention Russian as their native language, a large majority reported that they spoke it well enough to carry on a conversation in that language: 66% in Estonia, 70% in Latvia, 80% in Lithuania (Eurobarometer, 2006: D48T). On the other hand, the recent language acts in Latvia and Estonia put strong pressure on the Russian-speakers to learn the ‘titular language’ (e.g. through government language exams as a condition for citizenship) and this language is gradually being introduced as a partial language of instruction in ‘Russian’ schools. But, so far, this policy has obtained mixed results. (Siiner, 2006).

In the Baltic countries, English may become an alternative central language, linking the different language groups, which may also serve as a means of access to Europe and the world for the Russian-speakers who master it. English is beginning to serve similar central language functions in Switzerland and Belgium. All over Europe, educated temporary employees from outside the EU now postpone learning the local language in hopes of getting by with English in their new environment.

Maybe the most telling statistic of all is the percentage of students in secondary education taking foreign language classes in the member states of the EU. Almost everywhere English is favored over German, although the margins are smaller in the new Slavic speaking countries. Luxemburg is the exception, since both French and German are slightly ahead of English. In (Flemish) Belgium and Romania, French has a tiny advantage over English and it is the first foreign language taught in the UK and Ireland, ahead of German. But even in Italy, Portugal and Spain more pupils study English then French (let alone German). Of all high school students in the EU25, about 25% learn German or French, some 10% Spanish and less than 5% Russian. But almost 90% of all pupils in secondary education learn English (Key data…, 2005: C8).

Even if the English skills of these young Europeans are often mediocre, they still feel more competent in conversation than students who have studied other languages (Eurobarometer, 2006: D48f). They profit from increasing opportunities to use their skills, since most imported entertainment is in English and because the foreigners they meet will most likely speak English with them, whether in person or on the internet. Imported films, dvd’s, tv-programs, books, and especially textbooks, come increasingly in English, thus raising the rewards that English has in store for students. Today’s high school pupils will be tomorrow’s consumers, teachers, and voters. From their midst will come the future Members of the European Parliament, who will be representative of the electorate also in their growing language skills, especially their command of English. This is one silent development that is certain to help shape future language practices in the institutions of the EU.

3. Four levels of language use in Europe

It does not follow from the growing hegemony of English in Europe and beyond, that English will or should be the only language used (Phillipson, 2003). On the contrary, there are many occasions when some, many, or sometimes all official languages of the EU must play a part. All too often, these different settings of language use are ignored in the discussion and this adds to the confusion on the language issue.

It is necessary to distinguish four levels of language use in the EU. First of all there is the public, institutional level of the EU, most importantly the European Parliament in plenary session, and the EU in direct dealings with the citizens. Secondly, there is the closed, institutional level of the EU, especially the meetings of the Parliamentary committees and of the officials in the European bureaucracy. In the third place, there is the level of domestic civil society, where the citizens communicate within their national society. And, finally, there is the level of transnational civil society within the Union, where the citizens communicate across borders.

When the Parliament congregates, or when the EU is in immediate contact with the citizens, the multiplicity of languages is an inexorable fact. The legal nature of the Union is such that the constituent states are autonomous entities, if not fully sovereign, certainly not subordinate to the Union. This will remain so in the foreseeable future. The languages of these member states are constitutive of their national identity and a symbol of their autonomy. Their institutional status within the EU can not be diminished respective to those of other members without very compelling reasons.

The citizens of the EU member states are assumed to know the law of the land and entitled to consult the law in the country's (official) language(s). Analogously, they are assumed to know the laws of the EU that are directly binding upon them and are equally entitled to read them in the official language of their country (a member state may on and at its own account decide to translate the laws of the EU in other languages spoken on its territory).

These two arguments for multilingualism in the Parliament and in dealing with the citizens are based on considerations of treaty law and democratic principle respectively. There are many arguments of a more practical nature. First of all, if the status of any language is diminished, the officials and representatives from the country concerned find themselves impeded in fully participating in the deliberations within the institutions of the Union. Sue Wright ( 2004: 127) remarks: ‘If we accept the weak Whorfian position that sees concepts moulded by the language available to express them, then the speakers of the linguas franca are conceptually advantaged because the modalities of their lingua franca frame international exchange.’

There is a host of impressionistic and autobiographic accounts that detail the handicaps of speaking in a foreign language, even by those who have reached apparent mastery. (e.g. Niessen, 2005; Piron, n.y.). Weyd reports a little experiment in which he compared the speaking time of native and non-native participants in a meeting: the native speakers kept the floor much longer than the non-native speakers.

In fact, Members of the European Parliament speak no English, German or French or even no foreign language at all The language skills of the Members have considerably improved since 1992 (Mamadouh; 1995, Mamadouh and Hofman, 2001) and they are likely to improve further. But even quite competent representatives will still be hampered by their accent, inflection, and relatively reduced command of grammar, syntax and lexicon, while needing all their wits to persuade their peers as best they can. Speakers of the widely understood languages, on the contrary, can make themselves understood in their mother tongue to a majority of those present in meetings of the Council, the Parliament or the major committees, without interpretation, that is without delay, without a different voice and intonation, and without the unavoidable parallax of translation. This is a major advantage and a great privilege.[6]

Citizens of a country with a language that is relegated to second rank may also feel that their nation is diminished by the fact. Moreover, the loss of function of a language in some prestigious domain, e.g. in the deliberations, the documents and the correspondence of the Union, may contribute to its general loss of functions in other domains. It's speakers will feel the language has no part to play in communication across the borders and may therefore restrict its transnational use even further.

Even acknowledging disparagement is belittling in itself. Little children and less educated adults make mistakes in speaking and writing the standard language. Such errors undermine one's stature in conversation. Politicians who are constantly fighting over symbolic turf and prestige are even more sensitive to the minor but repeated humiliations of stumbling in a foreign language. The native speakers, on the other hand, even when not especially competent in their own language, have the 'natural' authority of deciding on correct usage. Pierre Bourdieu once exclaimed: 'Il faut désangliciser l'Anglais.' (De Swaan, 2001b). But how to wrest away control over English from its native speakers? Moreover, Bourdieu, that great connoisseur of the class aspects of language, should have been the first to realize that elites all over the world have a vested interest in maintaining full intelligibility on a global scale by adhering to a common standard English, even if that reduces many of them to second-class speakers in the eyes of the native English-speakers.[7] One, admittedly far-fetched, solution would be to forbid anyone to speak his or her native language, the native English speakers included (cf. Appendix 2 below).

Multilingualism must remain a fundamental tenet of any language regime in the EU, for reasons of principle and practical interest. Where can and should multilingualism be maintained to the full?

Whenever on ceremonial occasions the constitutional nature of the EU is celebrated. Just as all flags are flown side by side, all languages are used equally on symbolic occasions. This applies to the solemn, public sessions of the Parliament, to commemorations and festive events, to opening and closing rituals, and so on. Next to this ceremonial use, full multilingualism is also de rigueur when the EU promulgates a decision which is directly binding upon the citizens of the member states, once again for reasons of democratic principle. Thirdly, the same principle requires that citizens can directly address the institutions of the EU (in writing) and receive a written response in the official language of the state they belong to.

Finally, come the elections, at prime television time, no politicians should be prevented from making a speech in their home language, intended not so much for the other Members, but aimed at the home front. (This is not solely a matter of partisan electioneering, it also strengthens the link between the electorate and the Parliament as a whole).

In conclusion, the Parliament in plenary session and the EU when issuing regulations that directly affect the citizens, or when corresponding with them, must fully respect the multilingual nature of its citizenry, at least in principle. This does not rule out all sorts of cost cutting measures, practical arrangements to promote efficiency or to encourage direct, mutual exchanges between representatives. But the principle stands and must be acknowledged.

The second level consists of the closed meetings of officials or committee members. Here too, the multilingual, multicultural and multinational nature of the Union can never be simply discarded. But in day to day affairs, efficiency and convenience should and do count more heavily than in a public setting. At present the actual working languages are, increasingly, English, less and less French, and much less frequently, German. (Translating…, 2005: 6). These three languages also stand for the three major legal and administrative traditions of the subcontinent. For the highly educated and skilled officials of the Union, the combination of these three languages is just about manageable. If externally binding decisions, major documents, or correspondence with the citizens (usually firms and associations) must be translated, the logistics are relatively straightforward: from one of the three languages into the twenty others. Moreover, there is sufficient time to draft, correct and edit these written texts in all versions. [8]

The third level concerns language use in civil society in a domestic context. Here, custom rules, and if need be, the national government decides. In this context, one aspect is especially relevant: when in a given country a foreign language spreads and finally becomes so omnipresent that, say, eighty percent or more of the population has learned to use it, can the national language survive in the long run? Luxemburg, Cyprus, Denmark, Malta, the Netherlands and Sweden have reached this stage of 'diglossia' with English; under very different political conditions the Baltic states were and are in that position vis á vis Russian. The danger is not linguistic attrition, the intrusion (or enrichment) by foreign borrowings, or the wear and tear through code switching. From a sociolinguistic perspective, what may prove more damaging is the loss of stature of the domestic language when the foreign language usurps one prestigious domain after another in big business, high technology, advanced research, academic publishing, higher education, and, of course, sports and entertainment. And, finally, what is the added value of communication in the home language, when everyone in the land also speaks the newly dominant language (which at this stage hardly can be called ‘foreign’ anymore)? Parents may decide it is not worth their while to pass it on to their children, schools may no longer bother to teach its intricacies, pupils may spurn it as parochial and old hat. In short, the language may gradually, silently be abandoned (this is what is – wrongly – called ‘language death)’.

Admittedly, the national languages of Europe have been called ‘robust’, they are state languages, fully equipped and under the full protection of the state. They will not disappear as easily as languages that have not been armored in this manner. But still, what if the government unthinkingly fails to protect its official language? For example, because the rulers believe that globalization, international trade, or the advanced knowledge economy requires the promotion of a ‘world language’? This is precisely what is happening in many European countries. There is some reason to be alert and cautious. [9]

Finally, there is the fourth level, of all-European civil society. Here, no one decides, or, rather, scores of European institutions, dozens of governments, thousands of school boards, millions of firms, and half a billion private citizens decide on a day to day basis what languages to use for border crossing communication without much regard for the external and long term consequences of their choices and policies.

The Ministers of education who in the 70s and 80s throughout Europe opted to increase the importance of English in the curriculum seldom realized what other governments were doing at the same time and what the aggregated outcome of their reforms would be on the all-European level. Among the worst offenders is the EU itself, when in the name of cultural diversity and international exchange it facilitates the exchange of students between member countries, while those very students abroad usually attend classes in English and receiving Universities throughout Europe compete for foreign students by outdoing one another in offering courses… in English. The EU can not help it. [10] It must promote the exchange between Europeans from every corner of the Union and in doing so it cannot avoid that these encounters will overwhelmingly take place in English. The same unintended consequences flow from every other measure that intensifies consultation and collaboration across borders, as practically every measure by the EU tends to do.

The EU celebrates Europe’s wealth of tongues, the richness of its multilingualism, the treasure of its diversity, it encourages language learning, that is the acquisition of as many and as many different languages as possible. At the root of the official propaganda of the Commission is an elementary confusion. There may be many reasons to promote a diversity of languages, such as the avoidance of conflict or the protection of linguistic heritage, but they have little to do with cultural diversity. There is more diversity of culture in one neighborhood of Paris where people speak French, or in one of Berlin’s main avenues where they meet in German, than in all of Cyprus, Estonia, or Slovenia, no matter how many languages may be current there. In fact, language barriers shield people from a confrontation with one another’s way of life, rather than familiarize them with it (Ladefoged, 1992; De Swaan, 2004).

Young people are not so naïve that they would pick a language just for the sake of diversity or the national interest, they will chose the one that carries them furthest, that is the same foreign language they expect everyone else everywhere else to learn. It is striking how rarely respondents mention identity-related aspects of language as a motivation to learn them, e.g. to learn the language of their parents, or to 'feel more European' (Eurobarometer, 2006: QA5;Wright, 2004: 125-6).

However, this is only one side of the coin, and by itself does not explain the equally wide-spread public resistance to the hegemony of English in Europe which the EU is so careful to accommodate. In this context, David Laitin (1992: 152-3), adopted the phrase 'private subversion of the public good'. In the recently independent African countries that he discussed, parents would in public protest the necessity of an indigenous language, while in private making sure their children would learn the ex-colonial language so as to improve their career opportunities. De Swaan (2001a: 101) added the expression 'language jealousy' ('language envy' would have been better) to characterize the ambivalence involved. Most citizens supported the adoption of an indigenous language, in principle… 'But which one?' – 'not yours!'.

In the EU, too, many people realize that a single language would enormously facilitate communication and improve the democratic debate, but, at least in public, they are loath to accept the formal adoption of another language than their own as the one lingua franca. This applies even stronger to the speakers of languages with a Great Tradition, such as French or German (Ammon, 2006).

The ambiguity on the part of the EU's institutions with their high ideals on the one hand and their actual acquiescence in the expansion of English, reflects an ambivalence among the Citizens of Europe who are privately eager to reap the benefits of an omnipresent lingua franca, but reluctant to have its predominance publicly confirmed by formal arrangements. Hypocrisy helps to hide this divergence between actual choice and public stance. In the meantime, the spread of English continues.

This expansion is so hard to stop, because it is not the result of explicit policy, on the contrary, but of myriads of utilitarian decisions. In this respect, a language functions like a 'hypercollective' good: it is a collective good (when more people use it, its utility does not diminish for anyone), and, like other fully connected, freely accessible ('non-excludable') networks, it displays 'network externalities' (becoming even more useful to their users, when new users join them). As a result, it is to everybody's advantage to chose the language everyone else picks. Prospective language learners will therefore base their choice on what they expect others to chose, as buyers do when deciding for one technical standard in consumer goods rather than another. This explains why on the basis of shared expectations, stampedes towards one standard or one language, perceived as winning may ensue, as happens now in the case of English (De Swaan, 2001a: p. 27-32). This run to join the winner occurs largely spontaneously, without any central planning and largely impervious to institutional intervention. In the end, the EU cannot have an effective language policy, because of its own intrinsic dilemma, and because the citizen's follow individual preferences, guided by their expectations of other people's choices.

As matters stand, the first lingua franca of civil Europe already is English, and this outcome will further reinforce itself. The language predicament of l’Europe des citoyens has already been solved. English is now the most important acquis communautaire.

Appendix 1: Arithmetics of the 'relay' method of interpretation

The relay method of interpretation involves translation of any language into a restricted number of relay languages and from any one of these relay languages into the remaining languages. The method has considerable disadvantages, such as the double delay in delivery and the quadratic loss of meaning (if single interpretation would reproduce only (1-x) of the original message, two-step interpretation would conserve only (1-x)2 of the original message). Two-step translation of written texts with the aid of relay or 'pivot' languages suffers less from the delay, and somewhat less from the loss of meaning, since corrections can be made at any time during the process.

On the other hand, the pivot or relay method yields an impressive gain in efficiency. In a system with n languages, r of which are relay languages (n>r>0; n and r are positive integers), translation should be available from every relay language into every other relay language (this requires r(r-1) unidirectional interpreters), and, translation should be available from every non-relay language (n-r) from and into one (!) of the relay languages (this requires 2(n-r) unidirectional interpreters). This sums to r(r-1) 2(n-r) = r(r-3) 2n one-way interpretations.

This number is certainly smaller than for a system without relay languages, the notorious n(n-1): r(r-3) 2n < n(n-1). (Since r is a positive integer smaller than, the largest value r can ever take relative to n is (n-1). Substituting (n-1) in the expression proves it). Under the relay system, interpretation no longer increases as a quadratic function of the total number of languages n(n-1), but as a quadratic function of the – (much) smaller – number of relay languages, r, and as a linear function of the total number of languages, n: r(r-3) 2n. When all languages are relay languages (n=r), the system is identical to one without relay languages: r(r-3) 2n = n(n-3) 2n = n(n-1). When the system has only one or two relay language(s) it is at its most efficient: for r = 1, r(r-3) 2n = 2n-2 = 2(n-1), and for r = 2, the same outcome 2(n-1) results.

The new European Parliament with 23 official languages, will require 23*22 = 506 one-way interpreters to implement full multilingualism. Introducing an interpretation method with five relay languages (i.e. English, French, German, Spanish and Italian) demands 5.2 2.23 = 56 one-way interpreters. Including Polish among the relay languages (as seems to happen at present) would require 64 unidirectional interpreters. With three relay languages (English, French, German) only 46 unidirectional interpreters would be needed, and if bidirectional interpretation is introduced (as occurs nowadays), 23 interpreters could take care of all translation needs. If 'English only' (or for that matter 'French only) were the chosen method, 44 interpreters would suffice, or half that many bidirectional interpreters. If both French and English are adopted as relay languages, the interpretation needs will remain the same. In fact, adding a few relay languages does not make all that much difference, compared to the huge interpretation needs under full multilingualism.

The relay method may work to abolish itself. The speakers of the non-relay languages can continue to speak and listen in their native language under two-step inertpretation, but with considerable delay and loss of meaning. If there is a choice of five or six relay languages they might get into the habit of listening to an interpretation in the relay language with which they are most familiar, to avoid delay and distortion. This might make translation from the relay languages into the non-relay languages more and more superfluous. As they become more competent in the relay language of their choice, Members of Parliament might venture into speaking it too, thus addressing their peers directly or through one mediator only, and gradually diminishing the need for translation from the non-relay languages into the relay languages. In that case, they must accept the handicap of speaking in another language than their native tongue, but they also gain by reducing delay and distortion both when sending and receiving messages.

Efficiency is increased, but complete equality can only be achieved if the native speakers of the relay languages also accept to speak in another relay language than their own (cf. Appendix 2).

Appendix 2: Recent reform proposals

In recent years, a number of reform schemes have been proposed, based on formal analysis, or grounded on detailed knowledge of current practices (or both). Since the preceding discussion has shown that the language predicament is most acute in the European Parliament, it is to that setting that the arguments will be applied here.

Full multilingualism, i.e. translation from every official language into every other, the n(n-1) scheme, is still the basic principle and avowed objective of the European Parliament. Robert Phillipson (2003) has presented almost every sensible argument in support of it, but his foundations are mainly ideological.

All other proposals argue for a reduction of the required number of interpretations. The most radical (and fairest) scheme entails the introduction of a language which is foreign (if not equidistant) to all delegations: Latin, or, more frequently proposed, Esperanto (e.g. Piron n.y.), also by dint of its relative easiness to learn. Van Parijs (2004) has objected that once Esperanto evolves into a truly living language, this simplicity will gradually disappear and the language will become as messy as adaptation to its many new users and uses will require. The main objection, however, is that people will learn the language which they expect will be learned by most others. The approach to language as a 'hypercollective' good (De Swaan, 2001a) provides this factual observation with a theoretical foundation. It is hard to think of any strategy that might compel Members of Parliament to learn one language that is foreign to all and with a degree of perfection that will meet their needs.

Van Els (2005) has discussed in great detail the proposal to forbid all representatives to speak their native language. It requires at least two languages (otherwise the E-speakers would have no foreign language to resort to). Since two languages also make for the most parsimonious system in terms of the number of interpretations required, this proposal is optimal both in terms of fairness and efficiency. The scheme may gradually evolve into a system that requires interpretation only between those two languages, as representatives who are already forced to speak in either one, will no longer require translation into their native language.

Of course, it is quite ridiculous to force parliamentarians to speak in a foreign tongue and be translated back into their own mother tongue. But it is certainly not more laughable than having 500 interpreters for full multilingualism or fifty interpreters with cumbersome and distorting two-step relay translation. Moreover, there is no way in which the Members of Parliament can be enticed to accept it. In the end, Van Els himself advocates an English-only scheme.

Ginsburgh, Weber and Ortuño-Ortín (2005) have introduced a new element in the discussion: the similarity or distance between languages. As noted, some languages are almost entirely intercomprehensible, e.g. Danish and Swedish, others are as wide apart as Finnish and Irish. The authors compare different models, in which the most desirable outcome is based on several criteria: (a) minimization of translation costs (efficiency); (b) minimization of disenfranchisement (i.e. maximization of the number of representatives that understand at least one language in the proposed set). Ginsburgh a.o. either assume that all speakers only know their native language, or they also take into account their foreign language skills; and (c) the similarity between the languages used according to available indices of language similarity. The authors next assume different degrees of 'society's' proclivity to cut costs and of society's sensitivity to disenfranchisement. Various versions of the model produce very similar, and therefore robust, outcomes. Taking the closeness between languages into account, the authors show that French, Italian, and possibly Spanish (three of the present relay languages in the EU) can be mutually substituted without making much difference. The three-language combination, English, French, German, that is presently used by the EU in small committees and closed meetings comes out best. But Italian and eve Spanish may be added, without much affecting the optimum outcome.

Ulrich Ammon (2006), expressis verbis commenting upon Van Els, argues that citizens of small countries tend to favor the use of only a few widely spoken languages, since they are more ready to learn foreign languages, having never entertained the illusion that their own would function beyond their nation's borders. Citizens of larger countries, on the contrary, find it harder to abandon the habitus that goes with speaking a language of a Great Tradition, as they resent the chameleontic qualities required for truly speaking and writing in another language. His observations are on the whole supported by the most recent statistics (Eurobarometer, 2006: D48b-d): two small countries display low scores for foreign language skills: the Portuguese (with a world language outside the Union) and the Greeks (heir to the great classic language of two millennia ago). The poor achievement of Romania and Hungary may also be explained away, by their relatively isolated position among their neighbors, at least in a linguistic sense. [???]

Ammon proposes as the preferred subset: English, French, German, Spanish and Italian (and not Polish). This is in accordance with the present, mostly informal policy of the EU to use these five as 'relay' languages, for translation from and toward every official language. This scheme requires 46 one-way, or 23 bidirectional interpreters.

Philippe Van Parijs (2004) makes a spirited defense for the notorious English-only scheme. Since it goes without saying that Members of Parliament must be literate and also fluent in their national language, then why not also take it for granted that they speak at least one major foreign language?

Quite a few Members of Parliament, even today, would be quite embarrassed by such a demand. However, language skills of representatives are bound to improve spontaneously, since the level of foreign language competence in the European electorate is quickly rising. Moreover, political leaders will become increasingly reluctant to propose candidates who cannot defend their voters' interests without the help of interpreters, and the voters will be more and more hesitant to support them. This will not necessarily lead to English as the single language acquired.

Van Parijs' assessment that English will prevail is based on his assumption that people tend to learn the language which they are most likely to encounter in their daily lives (a version of the argument about languages as hypercollective goods). An added argument for English being indeed the most frequently encountered language is the omnipresence of English in the electronic media (which makes Van Parijs an enthusiast for the use of subtitles as against the practice of the large countries to 'dub' (or 'voice over' ) foreign programs with the domestic language). Van Parijs considers compensation from native English speakers to those who find themselves forced to learn it, but comes up with a better idea: 'Poach the web'. Since most content on the internet comes from American and British sources, students of English are rewarded for their efforts by what they can freely take from the web.

Appendix 3: Q-values in the EU before and after the enlargements

De Swaan (2001a: 33-40, 151-166) calculated the 'communication potential ' or Q-value of the official languages of the EU since 1957 in order to explain the acquisition of languages by the citizens of the EU in its successive phases. The Q-value is the product of the 'prevalence' , p, of a given language i (pi is the proportion of speakers – native and foreign – of language I among all speakers in the constellation S) and its 'centrality', c (ci is the proportion of its multilingual speakers among all multilingual speakers in the constellation): QS=pi *ci.

In the six-member, four language constellation of the EU (then EC) around 1970, German had the largest number of native speakers and also of native and foreign speakers combined. In terms of 'frequency' or prevalence alone it should have come first, but French, by dint of its greater centrality scored the highest communication potential, which agrees with the informed impression that at the time it was the most important language of the EU and therefore most attractive to new language learners (op. cit., 154-5). The sequence, in terms of Q-value was French, German, Italian, Dutch.

After the first enlargement, the constellation changed drastically, mainly because English had now made its entrance in the EC (cf. op. cit.: 156-7). Around 1975, English occupied the first place. Not too far behind, French and German followed in that order.

In subsequent years, Greece, Spain, and Portugal joined the EC, while the German-speaking contingent grew with the addition of Austria and the unification of Germany. English was way ahead. Germany followed in second and French in third place: their rank-order had finally been reversed. The other languages achieved negligible scores. (op. cit.: 158-161).

By the turn of the century, Sweden and Finland had become members. In the EU15, with eleven languages, English was even more ahead of its competitors (due to the increased number of foreign English-speakers) with a Q-value of .562. French came barely before German (.146 vs .144) with a margin too small to be significant; the reversal of positions may have been the result of the overall increase in foreign language competence which benefited English most of all, and French more than German. [11]

The most recent enlargements have brought little change in the overall pattern. English comes first place again (QE = 0.194); , before German (.045) and French (.036). The other languages obtain minimal scores. In the new constellation, English and German are both strengthened by the foreign language acquisition in the new member states.

Van Parijs (2004) argues that the factor 'frequency', or probability of language contact is sufficient as an indicator of the probability of language learning and therefore of language spread. De Swaan's Q-value not only takes into account this frequency (called 'prevalence'), but also the 'centrality' of a language. The latter is superfluous according to Van Parijs. However, the Q-value, admittedly a 'rough and ready measure', reproduced the larger communication potential of French as compared to German (with more speakers) in the EU until the enlargement of 2004, which cannot be explained on the basis of frequency (prevalence) alone. The measure was designed to explain the spread of (super)central languages, especially the former colonial language in newly independent countries where only a small elite initially used it. In these cases, too, 'frequency' or 'prevalence' alone could not account for the process.

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FOOTNOTES:

[1] Formally, all 'official languages' are also 'working languages', but in fact only English, French and German are used - in decreasing order – as such. 'Relay' or 'pivot languages' are used as intermediaries in the translation between pairs of less widely spoken languages.

[2] The Council of Europe promulgates identical ideas, in an even loftier vein (e.g. Recommendation, 2001).

[3] 'Whenever in Europe one encounters the phrase "diversity of language and culture is a great richness, wealth treasure…" one can be sure the predominant language will be English and the hegemonic culture American.' (Niessen, 2005, p. 83).

[4] In the early nineties, I taught a class under the Erasmus program with a dozen students from Eastern and Central Europe and one Russian student. When asked, all students, except the Russian, protested that they did not know a word of Russian. I was quite puzzled, but then the Russian student whispered: ‘They are all lying’. In fact, they had never learned much, practiced little, and left their skills to rust after the Transition. They might have understood some Russian, had they wanted to… How the students sat through the thousands of hours of Russian classes is best left to a novelist to describe.
A clever student from the former East Germany then wrote a paper about ‘Language denial’ in Central and Eastern Europe. This is a much more widely spread phenomenon: it affected Dutch students in German classes up to the eighties, it still applies to Walloon students of compulsory Dutch, and to Flemish students compelled to learn French.

[5] A government survey of the ethnic composition of the Latvian population of Latvia shows 58.6% Latvians, 28.8% Russians, 3.9 % Belorussians, 2.6% Ukranians, and 2.5% Poles (Hogan-Brun, 2006: p. 317; these were relatively recent arrivals, as In the 1930s Latvia was ethnically almost homogeneous. --- In Estonia the proportion of Russians increased from 8% in 1939 to 35% in 1989.’ Siiner, 2006: p. 166; cf. also Ozolins, 1999: p. 12).

[6] This does not necessarily mean that there should be compensation. There are many comparative advantages that some nations hold and others not, without the matter of compensation or fairness ever being invoked: oil and gas deposits, a pleasant climate, a location near the sea and three great estuaries…

[7] What is feasible and a matter of the highest priority is to dislodge the American and British gatekeepers of English, publishers, distributors, editors, etc., from their hold on the market of English texts by founding agencies and companies which perform those tasks with a European perspective in mind.

[8] Translation is invariably mentioned as cost factor, and it is, but there is also a hidden yield that ought to be dear to the EU which puts so much value on cultural diversity and exchange: the many thousands of interpreters and translators also constitute a reservoir of intermediaries between the languages, the cultures and the societies of Europe.Their formation should also be aimed at this latent task.

[9] The Dutch are among the most enthusiastic converts to English, yet the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences issued a report under the suggestive title: ‘Dutch, unless…’, proposing that Dutch be the language of choice in science and education, unless good reasons are advanced for using English.

[10] But recently it has acknowledged these 'unforeseen consequences'. The universities should do something about it: University language policies should therefore include explicit actions to promote the national or regional language.' But how can this boost the eagerly sought attendance of foreign students? (Cf. Promoting language learning, 2003; I.3)

[11] Q-values cannot be compared between different periods, because of changing membership in the EU and, as a consequence, changing proportions. However, rankings according to Q-value may be compared over time.

[12] All websites were visited around December 5, 2006.